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In this paper I wil discuss some aspects of the principal U. S laws 
that may be used to restrict imports into the Umted States. I will be 
looking at these laws more from the viewpoint of a practis担Elawyer 
than that of an academic. Although I have just completed a year at ICU 
teaching vanous aspects of international law including a course on the 
GATT thls was simply a year’s divemon from my normal occupation 
as a member of a law firm in Waslungton, D. C , where I specialize加
international trade cases. One of the great pleasures of a practice of thls 
kind is the enormous diversity of clients. I have represented Colombian 
growers of cut flowers, Swiss cheese and watch producers, Mexican and 
Swedish steelmakers, and a Fmmsh manufacturer of ice hockey sticks, to 
name a few. 
1 will first discuss some of the important aspects of the four m句or
laws used to restnct泊1ports the Antidumping Act, the Countervailmg 
Duties statute, the Unfair Trade Practices Statute, and the Escape Clause. 
Then I will focus on a couple of topical and extremely important issues 
the Zenith case on countervailing duties recently decided by the U. S 
Supreme Court, and the cost-of-production and trigger-price systems as 
used under the Ant1dumping Act m connection with stel加1ports.Both 
of these, of course, are matters of great interest to Jap皿．
* Partner, Arnold & Porter, Washmgton, D C.; Visiting Associate Pro-
fessor of Political Science, International Christian University, 1977-
78. This paper is a slightly extended version of remarks delivered by 
Mr. Macrory to the Japanese Institute of International Business Law 
on May 24, 1978, and subsequently published （皿 Japanese)in the 
Institute’S journal. 
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First, though, some brief general observations Many of the difficul 
ties in the trade field result from the rigid separation between the Execu-
tive and the Legislature in the American political system. On most trade 
issues the Executive B日nch,mindful of the international obligations of 
the United States, tends to lean toward the liberal trade side. But it 
cannot ignore the often strong protectionist sympathies m Congress -
often the result of constituent pre田町田 onindividual senators and con-
gressmenー andthe tension between the two branches of government is 
often colossal. 
This tension is well illustrated by the Trade Act of 1975, the most 
important piece of U S. legislation in the trade field for more than a 
decade. Primarily, of course, the Act was designed to give the United 
States Government authority to participate m the multilateral trade 
negotiations now proceed泊Etoward what I hope will be a successful con-
clusion m Geneva. But the Administration took the opportunity to make 
some changes that it felt were needed in the basic trade legislation And, 
more importantly, Congress itself used the Act as a vehicle for some very 
signi白cantchanges m the existing law Some of these were substantive, 
for example the cost of-production amendment to the Antidumping Act, 
discussed later in this paper. But others were procedural, and it 1s these, 
more th田1anything else, that have led to the spate of trade cases in the 
last three years 
The general aim of these procedural amendments was to reduce the 
degree of discretion given to the Execulive Branch m the administration 
of the trade laws. In part, at least, this represented a reaction to what 
many viewed as abuses of executive discretion by the Nixon Administra 
lion (the Act was pa田edonly a few months after President Nixon’s 
resignation). Thus, for example: 
(I) For the first time, Congress imposed strict time limits on investi 
gations under the trade laws. Although the Treasury Department 
had conducted anlidumping mvestigations under self-i nposed 
time limits, there was no limit of any kind on countervailing in 
vestigations. This enabled Treasury to quietly set aside cases that 
it did not want to de口deSome cases had languished for as much 
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as six years without any act10n 
(2) The 1975 Act limited the Executrve’s freedom of action in some 
cases, particularly the escape clause, by providing for congre田ion-
al override of its decisions. This has, in my judgement, had a 
profound impact on the Presidential decisions m such important 
escape clause cases as specialty steel and footwear 
(3) For the first time, the domestic manufacturer who had filed a 
countervailing duty complaint was given the right to appeal to the 
courts from a negative decision by the Treasury Department Pre-
vi叩 sly,the only right to judicial review (admittedly a rather 
limited one) was that of the importer after an affirmative decision. 
Without this amendment, it is unlikely that the Ze.則的casewould 
have reached the courts 
キ＊＊
Let me turn now to a brief review of the four principal statutes used 
to restrict imports (there are others, of course, but generally these are 
＂】les sigmficant). Appendix A, a chart outlinmg some of the main features 
of these laws, may be helpful in indicating some of the similarities of and 
differences between the statutes. 
I The Antidumping Act 
At least unt立1975,this was the most widely used of the statutes by 
U. S. manufacturers seeking relief from imports Dumping is the exporta-
lion of goods at prices lower than those charged in another market 
(usually the manufacturer’s domestic market), and it is treated by most 
countnes as an unfau practice m international trade. The rationale 
behind the condemnation of dumpmg is that manufacturers may use 
“exce田 profits”generatedfrom a monopolistic or oligopolistrc home (or 
other) market to unfairly subsidize exports Under U S law two con-
ditions must be met before antidumping duties may be imposed 
(a) there must be sales at Less Than Fair Value （“LTFV”） as 
defined by the Act, i.e., dumping in the economic sense; and 
(b) the LTFV sales must国usei町uryor likelihood of injury to a 
domestic industry. 
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The mvesllgation 1s divided，加arather cumbersome fashion, into two 
partsー theLTFV determination being made by Treasury, following an 
investigation by血eCustoms Service (an arm of Treasury), the injury 
determination being made by the Internat10nal Trade Commission 
(formerly called the Tariff Commi田ion).The two investigations take 
place in sequence, not simultaneously, so that the in1ury phase does not 
be伊 unlessand unt丑anLTFV determination is made by Treasury'." 
The statute requires出atm determining whether or not there are sales 
at LTFV, the export price to the Umted States be compared in the first 
instance to出epnce on the home market in the country of manufacture. 
Only if home market sales are non-existent or so small as to be an in-
adequate baSlS for comparison (or, smce the 1975 amendment, below 
cost of production), does Treasury look to sales to other countnes, 
known as third country sales 
There is a very strong preference for using home market sales. Until a 
few years ago, the Treasury regulations specified that third-country sales 
would be used where home market sales constituted les than twenty-five 
percent of total non-U. S. sales (1. e, home market plus third-country 
sales). But these were changed a few years ago, there is now no set per-
centage figure, and Treasury has used home market sales where they con 
stitute as httle as six percent of non-U S sales'." The new approach 
seems entirely inconsistent with the economic rationale underlying the 
Antldumping Act, which is of course designed to prevent a foreign manu-
facturer from subs1dizmg his exports to the Umted States with “excess” 
profits made on a home or third-country market where there may be litle 
or no pnce competltion. ln a recent dumping case I was mvolved in, 
home market sales were o凶y70,000 units per year, compared with 
400,000 to the United States, almost the same quantity to Canada, and 
substantial sales to other third countries It is hard to see how the home 
market sales could have been used to subsidize the exports to the United 
States to any significant degree Yet Treasury insisted on usmg home 
market pnce rather出anthe Canadian sales, which were far more closely 
comparable to the U. S sales not only in quantity but also in method of 
sale. 
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Only if there are no home market or thud-country sales (or they are 
below cost of production) does Treasury resort to what is termed “Con-
structed Value”， which is essentially cost of production plus overhead 
and profit I wtl dIScuss曲目inmore detail later in the context of the 
stel problem 
The most important aspect of the LTFV phase is the adjustment 
made to the U. S. and foreign prices designed to place them on a com-
parable basis. Essentially, each is stnpped down to an f.o.b -factory 
price, so that items such as transportat10n and duties are deducted. Also, 
adjustments may be made for such items as differences m quantities sold 
and differences in circumstances of sale, e.g., credit terms, guarantees, 
and servicing costs. But the Treasury rules m this area are very strict. 
During the 1960s it was felt by many people that importers were often 
unjustifiably escaping findings of dumping because Treasury was too 
liberal m allowmg adjustments of this nature The Nixon Admimstral!on, 
as part of an effort to田ducepressure for protectionist legislation (such 
as血eBurke-Hartke bil), promi田dto step up enforcement of the Anti・ 
dumping Act, and this included substantial changes to the rules on 
adiustments. In some areas at least, these changes represented an over・ 
reaction to the problem, and have produced results that are h1gl吐yunfair 
to the importer. 
For example, foreign manufacturers often offer substantially lower 
prices on their exports to the United States than on their home markets 
simply because they are seling in much larger quantities, and can there・ 
fore offer quantity dIScounts. But very stringent conditions must be met 
before Treasury wil t凶日 accountof such discounts. The rules relating 
to adjustments for differences in circumstances of sale are even more 
restrictive. The regulation is almost incomprehenSible, and it would take 
too long to try to explain it in this paper. The only bright spot is that 
there seems to be a recognition on the part of the new pohcy-level 
officials at Treasury that this particular regulation can operate unfairly, 
and I understand that it is currently under review. 
An antidumpmg case is often won or lost over the price adjustments, 
and there IS conSJderable dIScretion on the part of the investigatmg 
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ofi口als The investigation itself is carried out by the Customs Service, 
with limited supervision by policy-level officials in Treasury. Jn my ex-
penence, the competence and conscient10usness of the Customs Service 
case handlers has generally improved o同rthe last few years, though 
there ts st出 agood deal of variation. 
There are two other aspects of the LTFV phase that are of some im-
portance. First, confidenttality. Normally information submitted to the 
Customs Service during an antidumpmg mves1tgat1on ts made available to 
the complamant and to the public. Supposing, as happens in nearly al 
cases, the foreign manufacturer regards some of the mformation he is 
requested to supply -pnces, discounts and the like -as highly con-
fidential Under the rules, he may submit the information with a request 
that it be treated m confidence, i.ι，not disclosed to the complainant or 
placed on the public record The Customs Service decides whether or not 
the mformation should be so handled If it decides agamst confidential 
treatment, the person submitting it is given the choice of withdrawing 
it, in which case it is not used, or submitting it on the public record. 
So far so good But, and to my mmd this is a very big“butぺif
Customs does decide to accord con日dentialtreatment, the information 
must be accompanied by a“summary or approximated presentat10n”of 
the information which is“sufficiently ful and descnptiveぺ＂This sum-
mary is placed on the public record In the case of figures, Customs 
normally requires that a range be given within twenty percent of the 
actual figure. Thus, a price discount of five percent must be described on 
the public record as a discount in the r叩 geof 4-6 percent, or 4 9-6.9 
percent. This may appear to offer litle disg山田.Also, although it is a 
cnmmal offense for a U.S. Government of白cialto release information 
that has been submitted to the Government in confidence, I have known 
cases where a Customs official has inadvertently let slip some piece of 
mformation that was supposed to be given confidential treatment. 
The foreign manufacturer who fels that part of the information 
relevant to the case is so confidential that he cannot even risk submitting 
it to Customs m confidence faces somethmg of a dilemma For, although 
Customs has no means of forcing disclosure of the mformat10n, it takes 
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the position (perhaps understandably) that in the absence of information 
from the foreign manufacturer as to his prices, discounts, etc , it w出use
“the best information available’＇. This 1s usually the material submitted 
by the complainant, which is of course unlikely to be favorable to the 
foreign manufacturer. I understand that this was a serious problem m the 
recent cases involvmg Japanese stel 
A second issue of importance relates to exchange rate日uctuations.In 
these days of floatmg and sometimes rapidly changmg exchange rates, 
what obligation does the foreign manufacturer have to adjust his prices 
to the United States in accordance with the ups and downs of the dollarワ
A Treasury regulation出 providesthat foreign manufacturers (and U. S 
importers) are expected to act within a reasonable period of time to take 
account of pnce differences resulting from “sustamed changes in prevail-
ing exchange rates”On the other hand, they need not adjust for tempo-
rary exchange rate fluctuations So Treasury would not be sympathetic 
to a Japanese manufacturer who explamed that his price to the United 
States had been established on the basis of an exchange rate of ¥350 to 
the dollar. On the other hand, a rate of ¥200 might be acceptable, at 
least for the time being・
A few brief pomts about the International Trade Commission’s m-
vestigation of i町ury.First, note the very short tuneー onlythree months 
in which the Commission must complete its inquiry. This puts great 
pressure on both the Commission and the participants Although not 
required to do so by the statute, the Commission invanably holds a rela-
tively formal public hearing at which testimony may be presented by 
interested parties. In order to give itself enough time to digest the 
results of the heanng, the Commission holds the hearing roughly six 
weeks after the case has been referred to 1t. Speaking from practical 
expenence, six weeks is an uncomfortably short time within which to 
marshal the facts, and to locate and prepare the necessary fact witnesses 
and economic experts 
What about the legal test applied by the Commission? The Commis 
s1on has decided that any degree of injury more than de mimm1s w~l 
suffice. This is clearly les than the “material miury”test required by 
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Article VI of吐ieGeneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, although it 
might take a zen scholar日出町thana lawyer to preci日lyquantify the 
difference But the injury must result not from the imports as such, but 
from the fact that they were sold at Le田ThanFair Value. Thus, in one 
case the LTFV margins were determmed to be 15 percent. But the 
imports were underselling the domestic product by as much as 45 per-
cent, and the Commission concluded that as a result of their basic cost 
advantage they would have had just as much impact even if they had 
not been sold at Less Than Fair Value, and so made a negative determi-
nat10n：創
Also, the i吋uryor血reatenedi吋urymust be to an indu.<try in the 
United States. An antidumping investigation is usually begun by a 
single manufacturer filing a complaint. But it wil not be enough for him 
to show that he alone has been hurt by the LTFV sales. Indeed, the 
Commission wil be quite sceptical of a claim of mjury made by a smgle 
member of the affected industry, and wil ask why other representatives 
of the industry have not appeared to support the allegat10ns. 
The Commiss10n's handling of the antidumping and other statutes 
leaves a good deal to be desired. The Commission is currently held in 
rather low esteem m Washington. There has been ser旧usdissension 
among various of the Commissioners and between them and the staf. A 
couple of years ago the Vice Chairman (subsequently Chairman) publicly 
accused the staff of incompetence, and went so far as to name names. A 
se皿orstaff member of the Commission was said to have seriously con-
sidered suing the Vice Chairman for libel. This is obv10usly a lamentable 
state of affam for an agency charged with such heavy responsib出tyin 
the mtemat1onal trade field. 
The quality of the Commiss10n decisions is seriously inadequate. One 
problem is that, unlike the courts and most other government agencies 
which conduct quasiゴudicialinvestigations, the Commission does not 
appear to regard itself as bound by its previous decisions, so that it is 
hard to develop any body of pnnc1ples on which cases are decided. Also, 
the published opinions are, in my judgement, lughly deficient. They are 
usually extremely short, and often no more than mere statements of con-
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clus1ons, without any reasoned analysis of how the Commission reached 
its conclusion 
I can best illustrate this point by referring, not to an antidumping 
case, but to the specialty stel case decided under the escape clause two 
years ago. Before granting relief, the Comm1ss1on had to make two find-
ings first, that increased imports had caused or were threatening to 
cause“serious”in3ury to the domestic industry; second, that increased 
imports were at least as unportant a cause of injury as any other cau田
One of the key I田uesin the case was whether the sufferings of the U S 
industry were due more to the effects of the economic recession than 
to mcreased imports, in which case, of course, the finding would be 
negative. The economic evidence appeared to me admittedly a biased 
participantー topoint overwhelmmgly to the recession rather than 
increased imports as the m吋orca出eof the problems. The domestic’S 
industry’s economic expert appeared at one po泊tto concede as much 
Yet on this critical issue, to which much of the evidence was directed, al 
that the Commiss10n could find to say was that“on the basis of叫lthe
evidence，＇’ it had concluded that increased imports were not les im-
portant a cause of in3ury than any other cause. As a lawyer who has 
represented many foreign clients before the Commiss10n, I am frankly 
embarassed by this kind of performance on the part of a U. S Govern-
ment agency. 
A final point on antidumping. As the chart泊dicates,unlike the other 
three statutes, there is no adnnnistrative discretion to withhold apphca-
tion of the Act Once the two findmgsー LTFVsales and in3ury一have
been made, al future imports must be assessed for antidumpmg duties. 
But tlus is done on a current basis, i.e , theTreasury Department penodi-
cally updates its mformation on home market or third-country prices, or 
Constructed Value, whichever is applicable. So by increasing its pnces 
on exports to the United States, an exporter can generally avoid the 
assessment of antidumping duties on his future shipments And Treasury 
is usually willing to revoke a dumping finding after two years of“cle阻
hving”， z. e., no or neghgible LTFV sales 
In some cases, however, there have been very substantial delays m 
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assessing the dutiesー in1978 the Treasury Department finally assessed 
antidumping duties on television sets imported from Japan in 1970 and 
1971. This kind of delay creates uncertainty for al parties, and seems 
quite uniustJfied. 
Il The Countervailing Duties Law 
This statute is designed to counteract the effect of subsidies provided 
by foreign governments on exports to the United States, and the remedy 
is an additional duty equal to the amount of the subsidy. Since the im-
position of strict time hmits on countervailing duty mvestigations by the 
1975 Trade Act, this has become a popular avenue for U S. manufac-
turers seeking import restrictions. The reason is simple. Under the 
statute, there is no need to prove判uryto a domestic industry"' Upon 
the mere estabhshment that a subsidy is paid, the duty must be imposed. 
This is of course inconsistent with Article VI of the GATT, which re-
quires proof of injury in countervailmg duty as well as antidumping 
cases. But the U.S. Countervailing Duties Law long pre-dates the GATT, 
so is protected by the “grandfather”provision in the Protocol of Pro 
visional Application of the GATT, which exempted existing laws An 
important issue in the current Geneva talks is whether the United States 
wil commit itself to addi時四国jurytest, which it has indicated that it 
wil do only if other countnes are willing to substantially t唱htenup the 
GATT provisions on subsidies. 
Note that the statute is written in very broad terms. All that is required 
is a finding that a“bounty or grant”is paid on the“manufacture, pro-
duction or export”of goods exported to the United States. Strictly 
speaking, the bounty or grant does not even have to be paid by a govern-
ment, and it has been pointed out that the law would theoretically .apply 
to the situation where a man gives his son financial assistance in setting 
up a manufacturing operation But in practice, the statute has only been 
applied in cases of government assistance 
The Treasury Department, which administers the statute, has applied 
it to a wide range of government programs beyond the simple export 
subsidy, such as export loans at preferentJal interest rates, export guaran 
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tees, multiple currency schemes, and the like. A fairly recent issue of 
some controversy has been whether grants and preferential tax treatment 
given to manufacturers as皿 inducementto set up facilities rn depressed 
areas is covered by the statute. The Treasury Department’s attitude is 
that they are, at least if a high proport10n of the total production from 
the facility is exported to the United States刷 Themost topical question, 
of extreme importance, is whether the rebate of indirect taxes -such as 
the Japanese Commodity Taxー onexports is subject to countervarling 
duties I wil discuss this matter later 
The 1975 Trade Act made one quite srgmficant amendment to the 
statute, though one that is only temporary in its effect. Formerly, there 
was no administrative discretion to withhold application of the law. 
Once Treasury was satisfied that a bounty or grant was being paid, rt was 
required to levy the duty. However, Congress recognized that the current 
failure of the United States to apply an injury test might seriously 
impede the Geneva negotiations, particularly in light of the expected 
flood of new cases as a result of the introduction of mandatory time 
limits It therefore伊veTreasury power, for a four-year period (the ex-
pected duration of the negotiations), to waive the application of counter-
vailmg duties after an affirmatrve determinatron. Certain conditions must 
be met before Treasury can exercise this discretion, the most important 
being that the country concerned must take steps to remove or substan-
tialy reduce the harmful effects of the subsidy -which usually involves 
at mimmum a commitment to remove the subsidy within a fairly short 
period of time. This discretionary power expires on January 2 next year, 
and there is serious doubt as to what will happen then While the Admm-
istrat10n could seek an extension of its power from Congress, it may be 
deterred from doing so by the fear that the legislation could be used as a 
vehicle for protectionist riders. 
皿 Section337 
This is sometimes known as the law against unfair trade practrces, and, 
as the chart shows, the statutory language is extremely broad. Tradition-
aly, however, the statute was used almost exclusively in cases of patent 
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violations upon a showrng that an imported item violated a U S. 
patent, the imports would be completely blocked by an exclusion order. 
A few early cases, however, involved other issues, such as passing off, and 
some members of the Commission would like to use the statute as a 
means of plac担gthe Commission in the forefront of the fight agamst al 
kinds of unfair trade practices mvolving imports, even though this is 
strongly opposed by other U.S. Government agencies on the ground that 
It WO叫dcreate an overlap with their own jurisdiction. The recent Sec-
tJon 337 invesl!gation of color television sets from Japan mvolved allega-
lions of unfa1r pncmg (dumping), and anticompetitive practices contrary 
to the U S antitrust laws. The Treasury Department and the Justice 
Department requested in strong terms that the Commission refuse to 
consider these allegal!ons smce they should more properly be handled by 
those agencies. The ITC firmly refused to drop the isues, and continued 
with the case. Since the case was later settled by consent decree, there 
was no means of testmg the correctness of the Commission's position in 
the courts, but no doubt the opportunity will arise aga出ー
If由euse of Section 337 to combat alleged anticompetitive practices 
of foreign manufacturers becomes commonplace, a powerful weapon wil 
have been added to the protectionist’s armory, since a Section 337 in-
vesl!gation must be completed withm twelve months (or eighteen m 
more complicated cases), a far shorter time than the average antitrust 
case in the courts. Also, the courts often have difficulty in establishing 
jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers, making it impossible to impose 
remedial orders agamst them Under Section 337 there IS no such d1fficul-
ty, smce the exclusion order remedy is exercised against the imports 
themselves The foreign manufacturer who refuses to appear before the 
ITC to defend himself does so at peril of having his exports to the United 
States barred altogether. 
With regard to the JTC's efforts to expand its sphere of interest 
through extended use of Section 337, I was encouraged by President 
Carter's recent disapproval of the Commission’s cease-and-desist order 
issued in the stainless stel pipe and tube case'." The disapproval was 
based in part on the ground that the antidumping issues in the case were 
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the subject of a current泊vestlgationby the Treasury Department under 
the Antidumping Act, and that unnecessary duplicat10n of mvestlgat10ns 
of imports would be regarded by other countries as an un1ustified burden 
on international trade It may be that the President will routinely disap-
prove Section 337 decisions which trespa田 ontothe jurisdiction of other 
agencies, at least where those agencies have the issues involved under 
actlve consideration. In tltis connection, it should be noted that, unlike 
the case of the escape clause, Congress does not have power to override 
the President's disapproval of an ITC decision 
The 1975 Trade Act made several changes of significance to Sect10n 
337. First, the Commission's function under the statute as previously 
written was merely to recommend action to the President, who had the 
final say. Now, the Commission itself has power to i田uean order, 
subject to disapproval by the President on the basis of certam public 
interest factors. Although this may appear to be litle more than a 
change泊 form,I think that m practice Presidential overrides of Com-
mission decisions wil be much Jes frequent than refusals to implement 
Commission recommendations under the pre-1975 version of the statute. 
Second, the Commission was given power to issue a cease-and desist 
order as a substitute for the ultimate sanction of the exclusion order, 
which was previously its only recourse. There was a behef that in more 
than one case the Commission had ISsued a negative determinat10n 
despite the existence of a violation of Section 337, simply because it felt 
that the extreme remedy was not just出ed.A cease-and-desist order is 
essentially a final warning to the foreign manufacturer or importer -if 
you don’t stop the practice in question, we will impose an exclusion 
order 
Third, pnor to 1975 the Commission's practice m patent casesー the
vast majority of Section 337 cases was to conclusively assume the 
validity of the U.S. patent in question Thus, an importer could defend 
on the ground that the import was not covered by the U.S. patent, but 
not on the ground that the patent itself was invahd Congress amended 
the statute in a way to make clear that patent invalidity may now be 
raised as a defense In at least one recent case, the Commission has 
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upheld that defense岬
N The Es回peClause 
The most卸iportantdistinction between the escape clause and the 
other laws discussed in thls paper 1s that under it there is no need to 
show the existence of叩ykind of unfair trade practice, such as dumping 
or subsidies, before rehef can be granted. Al that is necessary is a show 
ing that imports have increased，山田町asimple matter of statistics, and 
a demonstration of injury to the domestic industry to which血eincrease 
in imports contnbuted at least as much as any other cause. 
The 1975 Trade Act amended the escape clause statute in an extreme-
ly significant fashion Prev10usly, under the statute, the complainant had 
to show not only that a domestic industry had been injured by an in-
crease in imports, but also that the increase in imports had resulted from 
concessions g叩 tedin trade agreements Thls latter requ1rement, while 
consistent with Article XIX of the GATT, proved a difficult hurdle for 
domestic industries, and prior to 1975 there were few dec1s旧nsgrant-
mg escape clause relief. The 1975 Trade Act removed the link with trade 
concessions, and now al that a complainant need do is show that m-
creased imports have caused or threatened serious in1ury to the relevant 
domestic industry，四dthat they were at least as important a cause of 
that injury as四yother factor"" The new statute appears to be square-
ly inconsistent with the GATT, but I am not aware that 1t has been 
subject to formal challenge there. 
If the ITC makes an affirmative determination, 1t recommends specific 
relief in one of the four forms set forth m the Act, v白，increasein duty, 
tanff-rate quota, straight quota, or negotiation of orderly marketing 
agreements. The President is not required to follow the Commission’s 
recommendat10n, but may mstead impose some other form of import 
relief or none at al. But if he does not take the precise action recom-
mended by the ITC, Congress can override hls decision, m which case the 
ITC’s recommendation automatically goes into effect. 
In a number of the escape clause cases involving large industries which 
could muster strong congress10nal support and I am thinking particu-
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larly of specialty steel白idfootwear -the Executive did not follow the 
Commission recommendation, but mstead unposed what it felt was the 
mimmum amount of relief that would be sufficient to overcome the 
pressure for a Congressional overnde. In the specialty stel case, for 
example, a number of Executlve Branch officials beheved that the ITC 
decision that relief should be g叩 tedwas wrong as a matter oflaw. But 
if the President had refused to provide any relief at al, there was a 
senous nsk of a Congress10nal override, in which case the very restrictive 
quotas recommended by the Commission would have gone mto effect. 
Rather than chance this result, the President negotiated an orderly 
marketing agreement wi出Japan,and tried unsuccessfully to do the same 
with the Common Market and Sweden before imposmg quotas on 
imports from those countnes that were les restrictive than those recom-
mended by the Commission. 
＊＊＊ 
So much for my broad overview. Let me turn now to a couple of 
topical i田ueswhich directly concern Japan First, the Zenith case, which 
in terms of its potentlal impact on world trade must have been the most 
important U S. court decision for years. As we have seen, the Counter-
vailing Duties Law speal臼 broadlyof叩y“bountyor grant”being paid 
on the “manufacture, production or export”of goods. However, the 
Treasury Department has consistently taken the poS!tion that it is not 
obliged to levy countervailing duties m the situat10n where叩 mduect
tax levied on domestic sales, such as a consumption tax or a sales tax, has 
not been paid on exports (or, if already paid by the manufacturer, has 
been rebated). This is in line with the GATT.'" 
In 1970 Zenith Manufacturing Corp., a U S.manufacturer of televi-
S!On sets, filed a complamt with the Treasury Department claiming that 
the rebate of the Japanese Consumption Tax on exports of television sets 
should be subject to countervailmg duties. Treasury, m line with its 
customary practice, dismissed the complaint, after it had languished 
there for some six years. Using its new right under the 1975 Trade Act, 
Zenith appealed to the U S. Customs Court, which found in Zenith’s 
favor, i.e, that Treasury was wrong and that the rebate was covered by 
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the statute. Treasury appealed to the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals, wluch, by a three-two majority, reversed. Zenith appealed to 
the U.S. Supreme Court, which unanimously upheld the CCPA’s deciSlon 
in June 1978~＇ 
The case was of vital import四 ce,because a decision m Zenith’s favor 
would not Slmply have meant an automatic 10 percent additional duty 
on television sets imported from Japan (unless the Japanese Government 
had ceased to grant the rebate), but would also have resulted m the 
potential applicat10n of countervailing duties to a vast number of U S. 
加 ports Many other Japanese products are subject to a similar com-
modity tax which IS rebated on export, and the European Common 
Market relies heavily on a value-added tax which is likewise rebated on 
exports. An adverse ruling in Zenith would have covered al of these, and 
1t was estimated that a total of as much as 70 percent of U S. imports 
might have been affected. And, of course, bear in mind that there is no 
miury test m the U S law. All that a domestic manufacturer would have 
had to do would have been to demonstrate to Treasury that an indirect 
tax was being rebated on exports 
I might add that the whole ISsue of border taxes is not as clear as it 
nught seem. The GATT rules, which distingmsh between indirect taxes 
-which may be rebated -and direct taxes which may not -were 
drafted at a time when many economists believed that ind1rect taxes 
were ent1rely passed on to, and so borne by, the consumer. Direct taxes, 
on the other hand, were viewed as being absorbed by the manufacturer 
without being passed on If this is correct, then the GATT rule is appro-
priate, and indeed essential to correct what would otherwise be a dis 
tortion in the taxation of international trade. But many economists 
today believe that the d1rect/indirect dIStmction IS not so clear-cut, and 
in particular that a large proportion of the so called direct taxes are m 
fact passed on to the consumer In this event, the GATT distinction is 
not logical, and discrnmnates against the United States, which raISes a 
much higher proportion of its total t皿 revenuethrough direct taxes than 
other mdustrialized countnes. 
Whatever the merits of this viewpomt, 1t would have been most un-
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fortunate to have had it imposed unilaterally by the United States as a 
result of a court dec1s10n. If a change is needed in the GATT rules on 
border taxes, it should be achieved through multilateral negotiation 
＊＊キ
Let me now make a few comments on two aspects of the admimstra-
l!on of the Anl!dumping Act with respect to imports of stel. Fust, the 
so-called “tngger-price”system introduced in 1978. The system came 
about as a response by the Carter Admimstration to very strong pre田ure
in Congress for some form of ass1stan田 tothe steel industry m the 
United States As one of the largest industries m the United States, steel 
can muster powerful polil!cal support, and, given the very sharp nse in 
imports m 1977 and the substantial lay-off of workers, 1t was clear that 
the Adm1mstration had to take some action to restrict imports. The 
alternal!ve would have been to face the likelihood of legislated quotas. 
So the Carter Admmistration focussed attention on mcreased use of the 
Antidumpmg Act, and in particular mtroduced the tngger-price system, 
which was designed pnnc1pally as a response to complaints that the 
normal antidumpmg investigation took too long to launch and conduct. 
The trigger-price system involves no change m the existing law The 
Treasury Department has always had the authority to回itiateits own 
antidumping invesl!gations. In practice, however, smce its resources are 
limited, it has never done so, but has instead waited for domestic manu-
facturers to file complaints. The rules require the complamt to contam a 
good deal of rather detailed mformation, some of which, especially that 
relating to foreign market prices and (where relevant) cost of production, 
can be quite difficult to obtain. So 1t can t依ea number of months be-
tween the t町田thata U S manufacturer suspects that dumping is takmg 
place and the po担tat which he is ready to file a complaint, and from 
that point it will take roughly a year before a decision 1s reached. The 
trigger-price system short-circmts this process, by eliminating the t町10
needed to prepare and file a complaint, and by providing for speeded-up 
invesl!gations, to be conducted in les than half the normal tnne. 
The“trigger-pnces”are supposedly established on the basis of the 
product10n costs of the lowest-cost manufacturers, who happen to be 
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Japanese Any imports that are priced below the trigger prices are auto-
matically subject吋 toan antidumping investigation. Given the strong 
political pressure for some form of Inlport relief, thIS may well be what 
economISts would term the “least worst”alternative However, the 
system places a very high degree of discret10n m the hands of government 
oficials, smce the determinat10n of“cost of production”is necessanly a 
rather artificial process, requiring a number of quite subjective a回ump-
tions to be made as to cost allocations, etc目 （se page 42 , below). 
The system could be used in a subtle manner to restrict imports to a 
given desired level; in effect, a“back-door”quota. It is interesting to 
note in thIS connecl!on that a fairly Similar reference-price system in-
traduced by Sweden was the subject of a GATT inquiry twenty-three 
years ago. The GAIT panel concluded that although in principle the 
system did not violate the Agreement, its practical application might 
well do so:" Sweden abandoned the system soon afterwards. 
Much more troublesome to me than the trigger-price system is the 
cost-of-production amendment that was included in the I 975 Trade Act. 
It IS mterestmg to see how this amendment came mto existence, as an 
example of the workings of the legislative process m the United States. 
In 1972, a U. S. producer of sulphur filed a complaint alleging that 
sulphur from Canada was being dumped in the United States It did not 
allege dumping in the convent10nal sense, conceding that sulphur pnces 
on the Canadian market appeared to be no higher than the export prices 
to the United States. Instead, it argued that the sulphur, which was 
produced as a by-product of natural gas, was bemg sold in the United 
States at below its cost of production, and that this constituted dumping 
under the Antidumping Act as it then stood. After receiving legal sub-
mISs10ns from interested parties, including the Canadian producers, 
Treasury concluded由atthe complainant’S恒terpretationof the statute 
was wrong. So the domesl!c sulphur industry went to Congress and 
managed to persuade it to change the law. This effort was immeasurably 
helped by the fact that the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, 
which handles al matters relating to trade, was Senator Long from 
Louisiana, the home of a large part of the U目 S.sulphur industry 
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The amendment was ingeniously worded Instead of simply providrng 
that exports to the United States at prices below cost of production 
would be sub1ect to antidumping duties, it directs that where home 
market or third countりFsales are below cost of production, they must 
be disregarded in makrng the basic price comparison In this situation 
then, Treasury is obhged to compare the U S price with Constructed 
Value, which is essentially cost of production plus an allowance for pro-
fit which must be at least 8 percent. In other words, a manufacturer who 
is selling on his home market at as litle as 1 percent below his “cost of 
production”（as determined by Treasury) wil be found to be dumpmg 
unless he is making a profit of at least 8 percent on his sales to the 
Umted States. Given current market cond1t1ons, few 1f any steel manu-
facturers can be makrng出atkind of profit today, so that m terms of 
stel, at least, the cost-of-production amendment imposes a virtually 
1mpo回1blestandard. 
The vice of the amendment can be illustrated with a simple hypo-
thetical example Suppose that a foreign manufacturer has a unit cost 
of production of 100. He sels on the home market at 99, and exports to 
the United States at 104 He is not dumping in the conventional sense, 
since his U. S price is higher than his home market pri田 Nor1s he sel-
mg to the Umted States market at below his production cost Yet, he 
will be held to be“dumping”because the U S. price is lower than the 
Constructed Value which would be 108. In effect, the U S Government 
1s saying to the foreign manufacturer that unless he makes a profit on his 
home market, his exports will be taxed by the United States to the ex-
tent that his profits there f叫lbelow 8 percent. This is a remarkable 
result, and one that, in my view, has httle to do with “dumping”as that 
term 1s generally understood 
The Japanese Government, and others, have alleged that the U. S law 
violates the GATT. Certainly Article VI requires that home market sales, 
1f they e且st,be used as the basis for comparison rather than Constructed 
Value. It does not in terms state that such sales must be at prices above 
production costs But the United States pomts out that the GATT pro-
vision refers only to home market sales “m the ordinary course of 
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trade”， and argues that below cost sales are not in the ordinary course of 
trade."' This may be a valid viewpoint, at least in terms ofU. S. business 
practice But given the social tradition m Japan of refusing to lay off 
workers even in times of recession, a Japanese manufacturer might well 
regard below-cost sales, even for an extended period of time, as nothing 
out of the ordinary. 
A very strong objection to the cost-of-production provision is the 
sheer practical difficulty of determining production costs I have had 
some experience of也1s,since I represented one of the Canadian sulphur 
producers泊 thelengthy Treasury Department investigat10n of the cost 
of production of Canadian sulphur that took place following the 1975 
amendment (an investigation that, ironically in view of the origin of the 
amendment, ended in a determlnation that there had been no sales below 
cost of production). The complainants泊 thatcase inadvertently ilus-
trated the d1fficulties by submitting a cost study prepared by a well-
known consulting firm which, using three different methods of calcula 
tion each a valid hypothetical approach produced three different 
figures for the “cost of production”of sulphur ranging from $15 per ton 
to $ 45 per ton. 
I wil conclude with some prophetic words wntten 55 years ago by 
Jacob Viner, an economist who was one of the leading scholars of 
dumping, and who卸 1923published what is stil considered to be the 
classic work on dumping: 
“In the case of an industry producing from the same pl皿tand 
eqmpment a variety of kinds and grades of products, the exact deter-
mma tmn of costs of production is nnposs1ble . The development 
of comprehensive tariff legislation dependent upon the accurate 
determlnation of cost of produst10n, whether foreign or domestic, for 
its adm1rustration 1s a dream incapable of even partial realisation”＂＇ 
The Japanese stel industry may fel that“rughtmare”would be a more 
appropriate term. 
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Notes 
(I) Another of these laws is 19 U.S.C. §1862, which req山田sthe 
President to“adjust”the level of lffiports of any product where 
it is determined that such imports are be回Eimported “in such 
qu百1titiesor under such circumstances" as to impair the national 
security. Although 1t has been httle used m recent yea民 anmvesti-
gation under the statute was recently instituted into imports of 
mdustrial fasteners 
(2) This procedure is inconsistent with the lnternat10nal Anl!dumpmg 
Code, to whlch the United States is a signatory, and which requires 
simultaneous investigation of dumping and of injury. In an effort 
to bring U S. law more in line with the Code, the 197 5 Trade Act 
empowered the Treasury Department, where there seems to be litle 
prima facie eV!dence of injury, to send the matter over to the 
International Trade Comπtission at the outset of an investigation 
for a determinat10n whether there日“no回目onablehkelihood of 
iniury”even if dumping margms are found. Such a determmat10n 
results m a closing of the invesllgation. However, the ITC 1s given 
only 30 days within which to carry out its task, a time limit which 
makes anyting more than the most superficial of mquiries impos-
sible. The Commission has reached a“no reasonable likelihood 
of injury" conclusion回 onlya few of its “mmi investigations” 
carried out under this au甘10rity.
(3) Interestmgly, the change took place at a time when Treasury was 
conducting an anl!dumping investigation covering large power 
transformers from Switzerland. Home market sales were con-
siderably below the 25 percent mark, and had Treasury used thrrd-
country sales, as it would have been obliged to do under the old 
regulation, it would almost certainly have found no sales at Less 
Than Fair Value. In the event, however, home market sales were 
used, and these resulted in very substanllal L TFV margms. 
( 4) 19 Code of Federal Regulations （“C.F R.＇’） Section I 53.22(a) 
In the alternative, the foreign manufacturers may supply a full 
statement of reasons as to why the information is not suscepl!ble 
to summary or approximation. 
(5) 19 C.F.R. §153.52. 
(6) Germanium Point Contact Diodes From Japan, 38 Fed. Reg. 27339 
(I 973). 
(7) Except m cases involving non-dutiable products The statute origi 
nally applied only to dutiable products, and it was not unl!l 1975 
that it was extended to non-dutiable products This extension 
was not, of course, protected by the “grandfather‘’ provision in 
the Protocol of Provisional Application of the GATT (discussed 
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m the text below), and so mcluded an mjury test as required by 
Article VI of the General Agreement 
(8) See, e.ι，XRadzal Steel Belted Tires From Canada, T.D. 73-10, 
38 Fed. Reg 1018 (Jan 8, 1973). The case is now bemg contested 
in the U S Customs Court. 
(9) 43 Fed. Reg. 17439 (April 24, 1978). 
(10) In the Certain Solder Removal Wicks, 42 Fed. Reg 35231 (July 8, 
1977）， αff’＇d, 65 C.C.P.A. 120 (August 1978). 
(11) One of the Congressional Committee Reports on the Act suggests 
that the Comm1ss10n should normally measure the increase m 
imports from 1968, the conclusion of the most recent round of 
multilateral tariff negotiat10ns But the Commission is not bound 
by this. In the case of specialty steel the Commission used 1964 
as the base year from which to measure the mcrease in imports 
(12) See Article VI, paragraph 4, of the General Agreement 
(13) 437 U.S. 443, 98 S.Ct. 2441. 
(14) GATT Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 3rd Supp. 
(1955), at p. 81. 
(15) Article 2(d) of the International Antidumping Code, of which 
both Japan and the United States are signatories, provides that 
third-country sales or constructed value may be used where“be-
cause of the particular market situation, [home market] sales 
do not perffilt a proper comparison”The U.S. Government con-
tends, naturally, that sales below cost of product10n fal within 
this exception 
(16) Viner, Dumping: A Problem in International Y干ade(1923), at 
pp. 292-93 
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